so successful. The crisis which threatened the massive development gains in East Asia and the performance of the world economy showed that such systems were unsustainable and I am pleased to say the arguments of the cynics are now completely overtaken.
and therefore his government had reservations with regard to those articles that aimed to establish collective rights. In similar fashion, the US explained its rejection of indigenous collective rights (in its delegation's comments on s. 1 of the Draft The traditional approach ot liberal rights theory recognises only two categories of rights holders: the individual and the society. In their historical evolution, human rights have been perceived as the rights of individuals against state power. Opponents of collective rights base their arguments on cosmopolitanism, a theory which advocates for autonomous individuals who are free from their cultural tradition and can therefore make autonomous decisions, in contrast to the communitarian theory according to which the self has attachments to the culture he/she has grown up in. Liberals argue that the establishment of collective rights will reflect a totalitarian vision of the society and will raise tribalist or nationalistic attitudes.
The extensive philosophising on the need for cultural membership and collective rights is generally perceived by international lawyers as very engaging and very relevant to legal debates on claims for collective rights; yet, sometimes it appears to be lagging behind new developments in international law. If international law is defined as the system of rules and principles that govern international relations (Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 3rd edn, London: Blackstone Press Ltd, 1996, 2), its normative direction on the issue cannot be ignored.
In this article, I will focus on three elements which form the direction international law has taken in the debate on cultural membership and collective rights: the perception of groups as concentric circles; the idea of togetherness in difference; and the model of critical pluralism.
GROUPS AS CONCENTRIC CIRCLES
The liberal emphasis on the dichotomy between the individual and the state ignores the existence of any intermediate groups.
The rejection of collective rights derives from a notion of 'monotheism of the state', namely unlimited sovereignty of the state and the view that the state should be the only source of authority in each political system. However, this model appears to be inconsistent with the existing norms of international law as well as the international political realities. In the post-national state, although sharing the state's national identity, citizens have in most cases other loyalties as well. These loyalties may lie in groups smaller than the state, such as families, local communities, ethnic, religious and cultural groups, as well as groups bigger than the state, such as regional organisations (e.g. the European Union) or even the international society. All these groups represent a series of multiple loyalties that the individual has and consequently incorporate various cultures that influence the individual. For example, a Sami who lives in Finland has been exposed to the specific culture of his family, the culture of his village (which sometimes has a different linguistic dialect), the Sami culture, the Finnish culture as well as the European culture.
International law is in the process of recognising various sub- collective rights for indigenous peoples seems trouble-free. If community is seen as a constituent of individual identity, then enhancing collective rights need not diminish individual rights. By recognising the importance of sub-national groups, international law seems to emphasise the circumstances of mutual reinforcement between groups. Gutmann adopts an integrationist approach and comments that it may be possible 'to find ways in which local communities and democracy can be vitalised without violating individual rights' (Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', 14 (1985) Philosophy and Public Affairs, 308 330). Johnston argues that 'collective and individual interests are not ... inevitably antagonistic. The supposed antithesis seems to be based on a particular and intolerant conception of the nature of group rights.' International law also seems to oppose a pre-determined hierarchy among rights. Conflicts between rights is a common phenomenon of the legal profession. Any conflicts between rights, principles and norms are generally solved on an ad hoc basis, after taking into account various considerations. In possible conflicts between a collective and an individual right, the same process would be used. In her model, Young suggests a conception of difference that better recognises the heterogeneity-and diffusion of groups a more fluid and explicitly relational conception of difference: Unlike paternalistic pluralism, critical pluralism views minorities as partners in the creation or recreation of the society. The state actively engages in a dialogue with minorities in order to find the best way and resources to make minority cultures flourish. Moreover, the state creates institutions that enable the rest of the population to open itself up to all groups, by accepting them all as dialogue partners. Critical pluralism also believes in multiplicity: groups are seen as 'contingent rather than essential' and their very meaning can be moulded and reshaped through dialogue.
PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE
The idea of critical pluralism is realised through the various provisions on participation of minority groups in the decisionmaking process of the society they live in. The UN Declaration on Minorities proclaims that members of minorities have the right to participate effectively in decisions at the national and, where appropriate, regional level. In particular, the ILO Convention (169) concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries adopts a broad concept of participation in relation to indigenous peoples: states should not only consult indigenous peoples on matters which affect them directly; the consultations must be undertaken with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.
In the dialogue process, groups are conceived as equal partners rather than negotiators or imitators of the dominant groups. The critically pluralist society7 does not transcend group differences; cultures are not surpassed but acknowledged and celebrated. Institutional dialogue is very important, because it leads to the re-evaluation Kymlicka argues for; groups are involved in mutual corrective engagements. Groups are reconceptualised and re-cast and their differences are adjusted and reconstituted in a process ol constant and genuine dialogue.
Through dialogue, groups are challenged to accommodate in their own world the objective reality of the other. They interact, exchange ideas and benefit from the cultures of all the groups rather than just from their own culture exclusively. As Falk notes 
CONCLUSIONS
The concepts of concentric loyalties, togetherness in difference and critical pluralism appear to be supported by the existing norms of international law. These concepts form the basis for the equal co-existence of collective rights with individual rights and combine the essence of liberalism with collective rights. If indigenous communities are accepted and recognised as bearers of rights and duties, there is a greater chance to develop a coherent set of doctrines to accommodate their real problems and concerns. The inclusion of a wide range of collective rights in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples will render affirmative action for these communities easier, and indigenous nations that have o suffered discrimination for so long will eventually be compensated. /»
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